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PREFACE
This study is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Master’s Degree
of Financial Economics program at İstanbul Bilgi University. Banking has been so
important today, especially for emerging countries like Turkey that depends heavily
on the sector to fund the economy. In this context, the measurement and tracking of
the riskiness of the banking sector are vital.
The study aims to measure the riskiness of the banking sector via distance to default
concept, and it is questioned the distance to default is an early warning indicator for
banking failure and crisis.
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Sema Bayraktar Tür and my sister Ayşegül for her encouragement and help during
my study.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the riskiness of the Turkish Banking system analyzing 16 banks
traded at Borsa Istanbul(BIST) Banking Index between 1996 and 2018 by using a
structural approach known as the Merton Model. Also, whether the model is a good
predictor of the financial crisis and financial failure is investigated. Since the lit-
erature is heavily dependent on accounting-based models and artificial intelligence
models, the alternative measurement for riskiness for Turkish Banks is suggested.
In this context, the distance to default based onMerton’s structural approach is mea-
sured and via suitable logit and probit model is converted to the default probability.
Using these results, whether the model can be used as an early warning indicator for
the crisis and bank failure is examined. According to the results, the logit and probit
model is statistically significant at 1% level of significance up to 12 months. The
results also show that DD, in the case of Turkish Banking Sector, can be useful as
an early warning indicator for banking failure but, there is no evidence that it can be
helpful to detect economic crisis.
xv
ÖZET
Bu tezde, 1996 ve 2018 yılları arasında BIST’te işlem görmüş 16 banka Merton
Modeli olarak bilinen yapısal yaklaşım analiz edilerek Türk Bankacılık Sisteminin
riskleri incelenmiştir. Ayrıca modelin finansal krizlerin ve finansal başarısızlıkların
iyi bir tahmincisi olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Literatür, ağırlıklı olarak muhase-
beye ve yapay zeka modellerine dayalı olduğundan, Türk Bankaları için alternatif
risklilik ölçüm yöntemi önerilmiştir. Bu kapsamdaMerton’un yapısal yaklaşımı kul-
lanılarak, temerrüde olan uzaklık ölçülmeye çalışılmış ve probit ve logit regresyon
aracılığıyla temerrüde olan uzaklık temerrüt olasılığına dönülmüştür. Bu sonuçlara
göre temerrüde olan uzaklık ölçüsünün krizleri ve banka başarısızlıklarını açıkla-
mada erken uyarı göstergesi olarak kullanılıp kullanılmayacağı analiz edilmiştir.
Bulgulara göre, logit ve probit regresyonlar 12 aya kadar 1% önem düzeyinde is-
tatistiksel olarak anlamlı çıkmıştır. Ayrıca sonuçlar, temerrüde olan uzaklığın fi-
nansal başarısızlıkları tahmin etmede anlamlı olduğunu krizlerin tahmin edilmesi
için erken uyarı göstergesi olarak kullanılmasına yönelik yeterince kanıt olmadığını
göstermiştir.
xvi
INTRODUCTION
The detection of the soundness of a banking sector is so crucial because when the
banking system enters a crisis or failure state, then the credit channel does not func-
tion very well and an economy is entirely affected especially in the countries that
are highly dependent on the banking system and where the capital market system is
undeveloped. Furthermore, in the case of banking failures, society pays a substan-
tial cost, and it affects all segments of society, especially taxpayers. According to
the financial services sector report1, the banking system captures 67% of the total
assets of the financial sector in Turkey. Since financial markets are not developed
in Turkey, the banking system is quite important for companies to reach financing.
For these reasons, I implement the model suggested by Merton (1974) to Turkish
Banks to monitor the riskiness of the banking traded at BIST for the period between
1996 to 2018.
Option-based or structural models have already been widely used to measure the
credit risk of non-financial firms. Merton’s " On the Pricing of corporate debt "
study published in 1974 led to many academic studies implementing this model to
many various areas. One of them is the KMV, successful commercial version of the
Merton model.
The main objective of this study is to implement structural models in measuring the
risk of banks in Turkey. The literature about banking failure in Turkey is excessively
based on statistical methods and artificial intelligence methods such as support vec-
tor machines, neural networks etc. and most of the studies compare statistical meth-
1http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/publications/Documents/FINANCIAL.SERVICES.INDUSTRY.pdf
1
ods and artificial intelligent methods in the success of prediction ability. There are
not enough number of studies using structural models in Turkey. This thesis will
contribute to the literature by implementing Merton based model in measuring and
tracking of the riskiness of the Turkish banking sector. Outputs of the model can
be used to create an early warning system for the banking sector. As Rose and Ko-
lari (1985) said that banking closure is not an immediate consequence. Most of the
failed banks show some sign of the failure before closure.
According to Sinkey Jr (1975), one of the advantages of effective early warning sys-
tems is that resources can be allocated more efficiently and the examination costs
could be reduced.
In the academic environment, the model has been widely used for measuring the
credit risk for non-financial firms and some authors also implemented for banks.
However, it is debatable whether the model is sufficient or not. From supporting
sides, Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue that the Merton model is superior to Altman’s
discriminant analysis and Ohlson’s o-score based on logistic regression.
When it is compared to accounting-based bankruptcy predictionmethods, there is no
theoretical foundation for accounting-based models, contrary to option-based mod-
els(Agarwal andTaffler, 2008). In other words, accounting-basedmodels are sample
specific. Besides, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) stress that accounting ratios in nature
measure past performance, so it cannot be an indicator for the future performance
and accounting records can be manipulative, and there is a possibility that the as-
sets are not recorded with real value. According to Agarwal and Taffler (2008),
Merton-based models provide a theoretical explanation for explaining the failure of
companies. In efficient markets, market-based models can cover more information
than accounting-based models, and the results of the model are independent of time
and sample.
Also, according to Chan-Lau et al. (2004), market prices can tell us about bank con-
ditions. According to them, the advantage of using market prices stems from the
high frequency of the data, and they claim that the model is useful. As evidence,
they claim that the model correctly forecasted theArgentian crisis in advance before
2
nine months.
The thesis will be divided into five parts. In the first part, the literature about studies
related to banking failure in Turkey and the other essential studies except Turkey
will be discussed. Methodology part covers a brief summary of the options and
Merton-based approach. In the third part, the data will be analyzed. The following
section will present empirical results, and in the last part, the conclusions drawn in
light of the results will be discussed.
3
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 STUDIES ON BANK FAILURE
The financial failure methodologies can be grouped into three types; statistical-
based, artificial intelligence models and market-based models. In the types of statis-
tical based models, the ultimate aim is to find the best variables that mostly discrim-
inate between failed and non-failed firms. Typically, there is no robust framework
in determining variables or equations and the variables that affect the default pro-
cess are weighted. Some of them are discriminant analysis, logit regression, probit
regression, multivariate discriminant analysis, and so on.
The second type is the artificial intelligence models. Contrary to statistical-based
models, there are no statistical assumptions, and like statistical models, generally,
they have no robust framework explaining the default process. Some of them are
neural networks, fuzzy clustering, and so on.
The third type is market-based models, and they give a framework that explains the
default process, contrary to other kinds of models and they are dynamic because
they extract the default information from the share prices. In this context, the the
other types can be classified as static models.
1.1.1 Statistical-Based Models
Sinkey Jr (1975) tries to estimate the bank failures with the help of balance sheet
and income statement. The method of multivariate discriminant analysis is chosen.
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The data consist of the banks identified as problematic at by FDIC. At 1972, there
were 90 problematic banks, and at 1973, there were 20 failed banks. Each failed
bank was matched according to specific criteria. His findings were that for between
1969-1971, efficiency, and other expenses were the most critical factors in discrim-
inating the failed and the healthy banks, for 1972, loan volume and loan quality was
the most important early warning signals.
Lane et al. (1986) is the first group of academician implementing Cox proportional
hazard model to bank failure issue. They estimate two versions. One of them is the
1-year model that predicts the likelihood that survives from 0 to 12 month and the
other one is the 2-year model that predicts the probability that survives from 12 to 24
month. The data sample consist of 130 failed and 334 non-failed banks from 1979
to 1983. They compare the Discriminant analysis with the Cox proportional hazard
model. The results show that they performed equally well, but in terms of type I,
the latter was more successful.
Pantalone et al. (1987) analyze the increase in bank failure in the US states during the
1980s. They try to investigate the cause of the surge in bank failure in decades. They
claim that in essence, in overall bank management quality determines whether the
bank will fail or not. Deregulation is not the leading causes of bank distress. They
make use of the balance sheets and income statements to construct a logit model
that forecast the commercial bank failure prior to one and two years. In building
model, they have used five categories; profitability, management efficiency, lever-
age, risk/diversification, and the state of the economy. The sample included 44 failed
banks in 1983, and 69 failed banks in 1984 in sum 113 failed banks, and 226 healthy
banks at random. They divide the sample data into four groups; 4.group is used as
a test group. The model’s variables are net income/total assets, equity/total assets,
loans/total assets, commercial loans/total loans and the absolute value of change in
residential construction. The results are satisfactory. Prior to 1 year, the model esti-
mates the failure correctly at 92%. Prior to 2 years, this rate is 89%. Also, Pantalone
et al. (1987) stress that the economic downturn and the state of the economy is not
the reason for bank failure; the real reason stems from the internal management qual-
5
ity.
Thomson et al. (1991) make a point about the large bank failures throughout the
1980s. However, the aim of the study is to construct the model estimating the fail-
ure of banks including all sizes, not just large banks. Thomson et al. (1991) allege
that the logit model can be used to determine the failure prior to 4 years. The data
sample includes the year between 1984 and 1989, while the number of non-failed
banks is 1736, the failed banks are 78, 78, 115, 133, 193, 175 in 1984, 1985, 1986,
1987, 1988, and 1989 respectively. They choose the logit model because the or-
dinary least squares model has restrictive assumptions, and logit model is advanta-
geous over probit since logit is not sensitive to the uneven sampling frequency issue.
According to the findings, the model includes the variables related with capital ad-
equacy, asset quality, management quality and earnings performance, liquidity and
the economic state and all of them affect the failure prior to 4 years. The logit model
has good classification results in sample and holdout samples. While the model clas-
sifies correctly 93% up to 1 year, classification accuracy reduces to 82% prior to 4
years. Thomson et al. (1991) conclude that the logit model could be used as an early
warning system.
Whalen et al. (1991) analyze the failed US banks between 1987 and 1991 with the
help of the Cox proportional hazard model. This type of model produces the proba-
bility that the bank will survive at a specific period. Also, this study is, to some ex-
tent, is different in sampling selection. They criticize the matched sample selection
since it is based on the subjective assessment. The sample data include randomly
selected roughly 1500 non-failed banks and failed banks at the relevant period. The
estimation sample consists of the failed banks in 1987 and 1988 and approximately
1000 non-failed banks. The remainder is used to as a hold-out sample. Themodel es-
timates the probabilities that the bank will survive longer than 0 years to 24 months.
For explanatory variables, the end of 1986 data are used, and the financial ratios
are obtained from the call reports and local economic state indicator, the percentage
change in state residential housing permits issued are added to the model. According
to the model results, the ratios that affect the probability of bank survival was over-
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head expense ratio, the large certificate to deposit ratio, the loan to asset ratio, the
primary capital ratio, the nonperforming loan ratio, the net primary capital ratio and
local indicator related with housing. Results show that the Cox proportional hazard
model can be used as an early warning system since low type I and type II errors are
small and classification accuracy was high at 12-, 18-, 24- month prediction.
Cole and Gunther (1998) try to construct a bank failure estimate based on probit
model. They argue that the efficiency and the information content of CAMEL’s rat-
ing built based on on-site examination are fairly decaying as time passes. Therefore,
it must be complemented by the off-site examination, namely early warning systems.
CAMEL ratings do not respond to changing financial conditions very well. So they
formed an early warning model based on probit model. Their model uses the end of
1985 and 1987 financial ratios and 13966 US commercial banks. One of the models
uses 1985 ratios; the other model uses 1987 financial ratios. For two models, the
variables that explain the failure was equity, past due loans, nonaccrual loans, other
real estate owned, net income, investment securities and large certificate of deposits
and they are found to be statistically significant at 1% level.
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) update the model introduced by themselves
at 1998 paper. Their approach is the multivariate logit approach. But their approach
is much more related to a systemic banking crisis, not specific bank failure mea-
surement. So their dependent variable is the crisis. If the banking crisis happens,
then the dependent variable is equal to 1, otherwise to 0. The model measures the
fragility of the banking system. They extend their work of 1998 by enlarging the
sample to 94 countries and extending the sample period to 2002. The number of a
banking crisis at this period increased from 31 to 77. They conclude that the banking
crisis is highly interconnected with high inflation, high real interest rates and low
GDP growth.
Kolari et al. (2002) examine the large bank failures, and they compare the paramet-
ric approach and the non-parametric approach to create an early warning system.
They choose the logit analysis as the parametric and trait recognition as the non-
parametric approach. As a sample, they use the failed 50 large banks with asset
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size greater than 250 million USD throughout the 1980s. The data group includes
two groups as the original sample and hold-out sample. To create an original sam-
ple, they choose 25 failed banks and 25 healthy banks. In terms of classification
results, both of them show equal success; however, at hold-out samples, trait recog-
nition pattern showed much better performance in terms of overall accuracy and
large bank failure accuracy. The expectation is that trait recognition performs better
at small samples. Their results verify this idea, and they claim that trait recognition
patterns catch 2- and 3-variable interaction between variables about the failure risk.
According to these results, trait recognition pattern estimates large bank failures
highly accurately prior to 1 and 2 years.
1.1.2 Artificial Intelligence Models
Tam andKiang (1992) have one of the first studies that used artificial intelligence(AI)
models in the subject of bank failure. They compare neural networks and discrim-
inant analysis techniques. Their sample includes the banks at Texas banks failed
between 1985-1987. They use 59 failed and 59 non-failed banks as training data.
They compare the neural network approach to logistic regression, k-NN, and ID3 by
using bankruptcy data of the banks. According to results, the neural-net approach
offers an alternative to existing bankruptcy prediction models.
Alam et al. (2000) implement fuzzy clustering algorithms and self-organizing neu-
ral networks to predict the potentially failed banks. They compare two models, and
criticize the general dichotomous models whose inputs are failed and nonfailed only
try to separate the banks as failed and healthy. They stress the importance of a rel-
ative degree, and they argue that the fuzzy clustering algorithms assess the banks
on a continuous scale, not a dichotomous scale. They also criticize the studies that
include equal sample failed and non-failed banks. They choose 24 US banks re-
ported at FDICAnnual Report as failed at 1992. They eliminate 14 banks at random
and after they eliminate two banks also because of lack of data and they matched
each failed bank with 30 healthy banks. They divide the sample into 3 groups and
9 clusters. They implement fuzzy clustering and self-organizing neural networks.
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According to the findings, fuzzy clustering and self-organizing neural networks are
satisfactory to determine potentially failed banks.
Salchenberger et al. (1992) compare the logit model and neural network approach
for the estimation of failure of thrift(Savings and Loans Association) failures. The
data set includes 34.795 savings and loans institutions for the period of January 1986
to December 1987. June 1986’s call reports are used as a training set. Three sample
sets are used to test the models. At the first sample, 100 failures are matched with
100 non-failed savings and loans associations according to the geography and asset
size. The second sample is used to test the predictive abilities of the two models.
For each failed institution, the data was compiled 6, 12 and 18 months prior to fail-
ure. For 12 months, 58 failed banks’ data are found; for 18 months, 24 failed banks’
data are found. A third sample was called as “diluted sample”. The diluted sample
is constructed and 75 failures matched with 329 non-failed institutions. The two
cutoff points are determined. They are 0.2 and 0.5 for both models. And they find
that the decrease in cutoff point has a much more significant impact on logit results
related to classification issue. In other words, when the cutoff point reduces, then
type II errors increase more for the logit model. They also allege that at all samples,
the neural network approach was at least sound as the logit approach; in some cases,
it performs better.
1.1.3 Market-Based Models
The third popular method for analyzing the riskiness of firms is market-based mod-
els. These models evaluate the riskiness by looking at the changes in the market
value of firms.One of the important studies using this method is the one by Chan-
Lau et al. (2004). They try to construct a bank vulnerability indicator for emerging
countries through the distance to default based onMerton structural model. The data
sample includes 38 banks from developing countries. According to the results, the
model can predict bank trouble in advance up to nine amounts. They say that the
distance to default can be beneficial in supervising banks. The sample is between
1997 and 2003. They argue that in times of East Asian Crisis, distance to default
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has reached its peak level and banks’ shares reacted to this event, and their volatility
increased, and asset value decreased so that the model can explain the fundamentals
of the banks. To test econometrically, due to lack of sufficient distressed bank, they
define credit event as the decrease in the rating to CCC assigned by Moody’s, Fitch
or Standard and Poors. For 3-, 6-, and 9- month forecasting horizon, absolute value
DD for downgraded banks is lower than non-downgraded banks according toWelch
t-test. Then to test in-sample forecasting power for 3-,9- and 12-month forecasting
horizon, Chan-Lau et al. (2004) use probit and logit regression where PD is depen-
dent and DD is the independent variable. And they conclude that at 5% significance
level prior to 9 months, DD is a crucial tool for early warning. To test out-of-sample,
2 Argentian Banks are chosen that are downgraded at the near of Argentinian crisis
in 2001.
Another study by Bichsel and Blum (2004) investigates the relationship between
leverage ratio and capital and the relationship between the probability of default
and the capital ratio. Their sample includes 19 Swiss commercial banks between
1990 and 2002.The study use z-scoreas the probability of financial failure. The re-
lationships are analyzed with the panel regression analysis. According to the results,
as more capital encourages to taking more risk, and there is no significant relation-
ship between default and capital ratio.
Gropp et al. (2006) are another group of academicians that argue that DD and bond
spreads can give a signal before the failure. They analyzed European Banks operated
between 1991 and 2002. Since there are no failed banks if FITCH rating is below C,
then the banks are flagged as fragile, and they compare and test the predictive power
of bond spreads and DD. According to the results, the bond spread is very respon-
sive near default, but it does not give a signal for periods longer than six months.
However, DD gives a signal up to 24 months. Also, they analyzed whether DD is
unbiased and complete. They conclude that DD is complete because it includes all
factors determining default such as asset risk, leverage and earnings expectations
and also is biased because it measures the default correctly.
In summary, one of the first studies related to banking failures, Sinkey Jr (1975) used
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MDA. Lane et al. (1986) also used discriminant analysis to analyze bank failures and
compares with the Cox proportional hazard model and the latter is found to be more
successful. Whalen et al. (1991) estimated the financial crash up to 24 months with
the Cox proportional hazard model. The logit model was used by Thomson et al.
(1991), Pantalone et al. (1987), Kolari et al. (2002), and Demirguc-Kunt and De-
tragiache (2005). Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) construct the model on
a banking sector, rather than bank level. Also, Kolari et al. (2002) use trait recog-
nition, and in terms of failure accuracy, it is more successful than the logit model.
Cole and Gunther (1998) used the probit model to explain bank failure. Tam and
Kiang are one of the academicians comparing the neural network and discriminant
techniques in terms of bank failure. Alam et al. (2000) use fuzzy-clustering algo-
rithms and self-organizing maps. They criticize dichotomous perspective so suggest
fuzzy-clustering based on a dichotomous scale. Salchenberger et al. (1992) assert
that the neural networks are at least as good as logit models in some cases, they
are more successful. Chan-Lau et al. (2004) implemented structural models to bank
failure, and they allege that DD is a good indicator for bank failure up to 9 months.
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1.2 STUDIES ON BANK FAILURES IN TURKEY
1.2.1 Statistical-Based Studies
Canbas et al. (2005) analyze 40 Turkish private banks between 1997 and 2003 and
the sample includes 21 failed banks. They aim to create an "integrated early warn-
ing system(IEWS)” to detect financial problems early. They use probit analysis,
logit analysis and discriminant analysis to create IEWS. The reasons that change
the bank profile have been searched by the method of principal component analy-
sis(PCA). They claim that the most critical characteristics that change the bank’s
health are capital, income-expenditure structure and liquidity. They also find that
PCA is more useful to account for the features of the Turkish banking sector than
CAMELS.
Doğanay et al. (2006) analyze the banks operating in Turkey between 1997 and
2002. Doğanay et al. (2006) use the probit model, the logit model and the discrimi-
nant analysis like Canbas et al. (2005) did, to detect financial failure prior to 3 years
by using financial ratios. The results of the study show that the best model explain-
ing Turkish Bank failure is the logit model.
Çinko et al. (2008) use the CAMELS rating system for the Turkish banking sector
between 1996 and 2001 and conclude that CAMELS rating is not applicable for the
Turkish Banking system. According to this study, banks that are captured by SDIF
have higher CAMELS rating than banks that are not captured. This study analyzes
whether the discriminant analysis, logit analysis and artificial neural networks can
accurately predict which banks will be seized by SDIF with the help of CAMELS
rating ratios. All the models produce the same result, but the models are not satis-
factory in predicting which banks will be seized by SDIF.
Erdogan (2008) tries to create a logistic model that estimates the financial failure
for the Turkish banking sector. Data period is between 1997-1999. The estimated
period is 1999-2001. He argues that the logit model produces good results in es-
timating financial failure and financial failure could be estimated prior to 2 years.
Erdogan (2008) argues that the logit model produces good results in estimating fi-
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nancial failure. Erdogan advocates the logit model because the logit model does not
require the normality assumption. Significant variables for this model are share-
holder’s equity+total income/(deposits+non-deposit Funds), net income(loss) aver-
age total assets, net income(loss)/ average share-in capital, interest income/interest
expenses, non-interest income/non-interest expenses, and provision for loan losses/
total loans.
Ruzgar et al. (2008) examine the financial failure prediction model for 41 banks
operating between 1995 and 2007. They use the rough set theory and 36 financial
ratios. According to the paper, in Turkey, the most important parameter that sepa-
rates the failed and healthy banks is the capital ratio, and the models that are based
upon the statistical methods can be used as an early warning indicator.
Ünvan and Tatlidil (2011) analyze the effects of banking regulations and supervi-
sions made after the 2001 crisis and question whether the financial ratios affect bank
failure. In this context, 70 banks operated between 2000 and 2008 are analyzed, and
37 financial ratios are utilized in compliant with CAMEL ratios. Then Ünvan and
Tatlidil (2011) compare logistic, probit and discriminant models. According to re-
sults, discriminant analysis is the best method for bank failure prediction and, low
income, liquidity, and the existence of risky assets play an essential role in bank
failure.
Ilk et al. (2014) aim at modelling the financial failure in the Turkish banking sector
with the help of principal component analysis. They analyze a sample including 40
banks operating between 1998 and 2000 by using three models; logistic regression,
logistic regression that takes serial correlation into account via generalized estimat-
ing equations, and a marginalized transition model. They find that each model clas-
sifies the failure correctly at 93.3%. But statistically, marginalized transition model
performs better than other models. They claim that their paper is unique because the
panel data was never used in bank failure prediction studies before. They also claim
that even though they use the same data sample with Canbas et al. (2005), they are
more successful than their study because of the use of the panel data. Additionally,
they criticize Canbas (2005) study in the method of selection of the variables af-
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fecting financial failure. They assert that the use of ANOVA is not an appropriate
solution to select variables because financial data does not distribute normally. For
this reason, they claim principal component analysis is more suitable in the selection
of variables.
Ozel and Tutkun (2014) try to fit the Cox regression model to predict bank failure
for Turkish banks. Their studies are unique because there is no other study to use
Cox regression model to estimate bank failure of Turkish banks. The data include
all 70 Turkish Banks operated between 2000 and 2008. For analysis, they utilize 37
financial ratios. The additional important point is that Ozel and Tutkun (2014) ana-
lyze all banks, not just commercial banks. According to their findings, no-stratified
Cox regression model outperformed the logistic regression and other survival mod-
els. Low income, liquidity, and the existence of risky assets play an essential role in
a bank failure, as Ünvan and Tatlidil (2011) stress.
Erdogan (2016) uses panel data to create an early warning system for bank failure
estimation. The sample is the commercial banks operated between 2000 and 2012.
He stresses that there are a few studies using panel data to forecast bank failure. He
analyzes panel data using pooled logistic regression and random logistic regression.
The study is also different in terms of the definition of bank failure. Failed banks
are determined according to the return on assets because of the limited data of failed
banks. Return on asset is used as the dependent variable. Independent variables are
found via factor analysis. These are interest income and expenditures, equity, other
income and expenditures, deposit, due, asset quality. According to the findings, both
methods can extract useful information for financial failure.
1.2.2 Artificial Intelligence-Based Models
Kilic (2006) applies electre-1 model based on multicriteria decision analysis for 40
Turkish Banks. The aim is to create an early warning system to detect the problems
prior to 1 year. Kilic (2006) compares the electre-1 model to Canbas et al. (2005)‘s
results. Kilic (2006) finds that electre-1 model has 93% classification success and
makes a comparison in terms of type I error and type II error. According to results,
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the probit model has the smallest type-I error, and Electre-1 model has the lowest
type-II error.
Boyacioglu et al. (2009) implement support vector machines, artificial intelligent
methods including and various statistical methods to predict financial failure in
Turkish banks. Statistical methods used are k-means cluster, logistic regression
and multivariate discriminant analysis. Twenty financial ratios were detected and
grouped under 6 groups, based on CAMELS. The data sample includes 21 failed
banks taken over by SDIF and 44 non-failed banks between 1997 and 2003. The
data were divided into a training set including 14 failed and 29 non-failed banks
and validation set including 7 failed and 15 non-failed banks. Then, financial ra-
tios were tried to be eliminated. 12 variables were dropped based on t-test. After
this procedure, Boyacioglu et al. (2009) find that the factor analysis is suitable via
Kaiser-Meir-Olkin test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity and then implemented PCA
and 7 factors are found to explain over 80% of the variance, so statistical meth-
ods constructed have 7 variables. According to the results, Boyacioglu et al. (2009)
show that at the validation set the MLP type of ANN is the most successful meth-
ods, at training set, LVQ is the most successful method in terms of classification rate
with over 90% classification rate and SVM and ANN types of models are superior
to statistical methods in terms of classification rates.
Mazibas and Ban (2009) use neural networks to separate healthy and failed banks
prior to default by using 36 financial ratios between 1995 and 2001. Their aim is
to create an early warning system based on neural networks, and they compare the
relative strength of neural network models with statistical methods such as probit
and discriminant analysis in terms of failure prediction. They criticize that statisti-
cal methods have many assumption limitations, and they do not capture non-linear
structure in estimating financial failure. On the contrary, neural networks do not
have any requirement to build a model. Hence, neural networks models have ad-
vantages over statistical methods. Mazibas and Ban conclude that artificial neural
networks are better than statistical methods in estimating financial failure.
Yildiz andAkkoc (2010) try to compare the artificial intelligentmodels, neuro-fuzzy,
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andmultivariate discriminant analysis in predicting financial distress. They find that
neuro-fuzzy has 90.91%, ANN has 86.36%, and MDA has 81.82% of accuracy in
classifying the banks. They find that neuro-fuzzy is much better than other models.
Also, according to them, it is hard to interpret the coefficients of ANN, so how the
model is created is not clear.
Ecer (2013) uses support vector machines and artificial intelligence models to pre-
dict financial failure. According to Ecer (2013), as Mazibas and Ban (2009) stress,
these type of models capture the nonlinear relationship better than statistical models.
Data set chosen include 34 banks, 17 failed not the remaining not failed, operating
between 1994 and 2001. 36 financial ratios are chosen, but with the help ofANOVA,
Ecer (2013) eliminated 22 financial ratios. The aim is tomake a comparison between
these models. The conclusion is that two models are rather satisfactory, but the ar-
tificial neural network is slightly better than support vector machines in predicting
financial failure of banks in Turkey.
1.2.3 Market-Based Studies
Suadiye (2006) analyzes the banks traded at IMKB between 1997 March and 2006
March. The data sample consists of 12 banks but because of data suitability, 3 banks
are dropped from the sample. The aim of the study is to measure the riskiness of
Turkish commercial banks and predicting the relationship between capital level and
risk level of banks. Merton option pricing methodology is used to predict default
risk of Turkish commercial banks and is questioned whether there is a significant
relationship between capital level and riskiness via panel data analysis. The results
show that as the level of capital increases, banks take more risk, but their probability
of default decreases because the market perceives an increase in capital positively.
Sayılır (2010) implements logit models and Merton model to compare terms ana-
lyzed. She divides the study into two parts. In the first part, banks operated between
1997 and 1998 are chosen, and then logit models are constructed. The first one takes
only consideration accounting ratios, which are net profit/total assets, non-interest
incomes/non-interest expenses, liquid asset/total assets, equity/total assets and total
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loan/total assets. According to first logit model result, non-interest income/non-
interest expense is a significant parameter at the 5% significance level and equity/-
total asset at 10% significance level that separate banks taken over SDIF and banks
not taken by SDIF. In the second logistic model, accounting ratios and market ratios,
which are the difference between index return and share return, PD/DD, and the stan-
dard deviation of daily return for 3 months are combined. In this model, in addition
to previous variables, market value over book value is also statistically significant at
5%. In the second step, for 9 banks the structural model is implemented to measure
the probability of default between 1997 and 2006. According to the conclusions,
adding the market variable to the logit model increases the explanatory power of the
model, and when compared to 1997 and 2006 by looking at PD and doing t-tests,
the probability of default decreases structurally because of the measures taken after
the 2001 crisis.
In this thesis, for the Turkish Banking sector, and banks at the sample, distance to
default are calculated during 1996 and 2018. Thanks to long-range time, the consis-
tency of DD will be tested. In recent literature, there is not enough study based on
structural methods analyzing Turkish Banks, so I hope that from this angle, it will
contribute the literature in the Turkish Banking sector. Also, by testing logit and
probit models, the model suggesting the relationship between PD and DD will be
created for the Turkish banking system. In nature, the DDmodel is forward-looking,
contrary to other types of models. So, it is considered that updated DD numbers will
shed light on the current riskiness of banking sector.
When we look at the studies related to financial failure, it can be observed there are
a lot of different methods used, and they produced mixed results. It seems there
is no superiority among the methods. However, in this paper, the market-based
model is preferred due to two reasons. Firstly, unlike statistical-based and artificial
intelligence models, DD has a theoretical background about how default occurs. For
example, there is no random choice for weightings. Also, it is not sample-specific
and is independent of time, and also, it is forward looking and dynamic. It is because
this model extracts the failure information from shares price movements. But it
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brings other disadvantages; the normality assumption is one of the weakness that
the model suffers. Besides, some arbitrary choice has to be made in implementing
the model, such as the choice of debt level.
18
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF OPTION
In this section, the theoretical background of the Merton Model will be provided in
the context of the probability of default and the distance-to-default. But before, the
concept of an option will be briefly explained.
2.1.1 What is the Option?
In the purest form, an option contract is an instrument that gives the right but not
obligation to sell or buy an underlying asset to option holder who pays the premium
for the option under prespecified terms. The underlying can be anything that is
traded such as gold, shares, foreign currency etc.
Basically, we can divide options into two types. First is the European type, and the
second is the American type. The distinction between these is that the European
option can be exercised only at maturity, but the American type can be exercised at
any time until maturity.
2.1.1.1 Put Option
A put option gives the right but not obligation to sell the underlying asset to option
buyer. Short put payoff and long put payoff can be represented respectively as:
P = min(ST −K, 0) (2.1)
P = −min(ST −K, 0) (2.2)
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where ST represents the market price at maturity, K is the exercise price of the op-
tion contract.
Figure 2.1: Short Put Payoff
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Figure 2.2: Long Put Payoff
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According to Black and Scholes (1973), a put price can be found
p = Ke−rfTN(−d2)− SN(−d1) (2.3)
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where K is the strike price, rf is the risk-free rate, and S is the underlying asset’s
price.
2.1.1.2 Call Option
A call option gives the right but not obligation to buy the underlying asset to option
buyer.
Figure 2.3: Short Call Payoff
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Figure 2.4: Short Call Payoff
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Its payoff can be represented as
C = max(ST −K, 0) (2.6)
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C = −max(ST −K, 0) (2.7)
According to Black and Scholes (1973), a call option price can be found
c = SN(d1)−Ke−rfTN(d2) (2.8)
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ln( S
K
) + (rf +
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σ
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(2.9)
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ln( S
K
) + (rf − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
(2.10)
where K is the strike price, rf is the risk-free rate, and S is the underlying asset’s
price.
2.2 THE MODEL
2.2.1 Assumptions of the Merton Model
1. Share prices change stochastically and randomly. Merton model assumes that
the firm’s asset value is log-normally distributed with constant volatility and
follows the Geometric Brownian motion. Hence, it can be inferred from this
log-normality assumption is that the returns are also normally distributed.
dVA
VA
= µdt + σAdWt (2.11)
dVA = VAµdt + σAVAdWt (2.12)
lnVA,t ∼ N(lnVA + (µ− 1
2
σ2At), σ
2
At) (2.13)
VA,t = VA0e
(µ−σ2A)t+σA
√
tWt (2.14)
ln(
VA,t
VA,0
) ∼ N(µ− 1
2
σ2At, σ
2
At) (2.15)
where W∼N(0, 1) represents a Wiener process that is a stochastic process.
VA is the asset value and µ is the instantaneous drift.
2. There is no dividend payment to shareholders.
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3. The model builds on the assumption that the firm has debt maturing at time
T, in the form of a zero-coupon bond.
4. Market interest rates are constant and are known during an option contract.
5. All investors can lend and borrow from the risk-free rate.
6. There is no transaction cost and tax.
7. The structure of the debt of the firm is constant. Debt’s form is a zero-coupon
bond, and at the end of the holding period pays principal and interest. Basic
firm’s balance sheet can be represented as:
VA,T = VL,T + VE,T (2.16)
where VL,T is debt and is in the form of a zero-coupon bond. The value of a
firm is irrespective of the structure capital.
8. The model’s horizon is the 1-year period.
9. The default can be happened at the maturity of the debt, not before.
10. Markets are fully competitive, and there is no arbitrage possibility.
11. Short selling is allowed.
12. Trading is continuous.
13. Shareholders’ wealth is tried to be maximized by management.
14. The firm does not buy back shares issued and not issue senior claims.
2.2.2 Logic Behind Merton Model
In structural methodology, default is an endogenous process, andMerton model pro-
vides a theoretical framework that explains which condition will give rise to the
default process. Actually, in the original paper, the main aim is to create a model
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pricing risky debts. Merton(1974) extended the option pricing method introduced
by Black and Scholes(1973) to price risky debt instruments.
In his seminal paper, Merton argued that the equity of the firm could be regarded
as the European call option on the firm’s asset value and debtholders have the short
position on the firm’s asset value. In this way, the credit risk of the firm can be
measured by analyzing the capital structure of the firm. His model then is known as
”structural model” based on the fact that the credit risk of the firm can be explained
by analyzing its capital structure. Credit risk of the firm can be priced by looking at
the value of the asset and the liability of a firm.
In a typical firm, the asset value will be equal to the sum of equity value and the
liability value. Shareholders have limited liabilities on firm and contingent claim
on firm assets. They will get after the debtholders’ receivables get paid.
VA = VE + VL (2.17)
Figure 2.5: Default Process
Note. Adapted from ”Modeling Default Risk,” by Crosbie, P., Bohn, J.,
2003,Research Report, Moody’s KMV Corporation, p.13.
The purpose of the Contingent Claim Analysis approach is to determine how to
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change the claims on firms as the asset value of the firm changes. In this model, the
firm has two options to finance its assets with equity and debt. Under the assump-
tion that the default only happens at the maturity date, what the important is the firm
value at maturity. So, the probability of default can be defined at this model is the
probability that the asset value remains below the liability of the firm at maturity. At
figure 2.5, the shaded area that remains the area between default point line(default
barrier) and the distribution of asset value is the probability of default. The expected
asset value mainly determines the default status at maturity.
In the figure, the line called the default point(default barrier) is the sum of repay-
ments of interest rate and principal of the debt within a year. The possible asset
value is determined by the lognormal behaviour one of the firms’ value. The figure
shows this with the dashed line. However, depending on the asset volatility of the
firm, asset value can take different values. This phenomenon is displayed with the
possible asset value path line in the figure.
The relative distance between the default barrier(default line)1 and asset value af-
fects the probability of default. When asset value gets closer to the default barrier,
the credit risk of the firm increases. Also, asset volatility is related to the likelihood
of default because when asset volatility is high, then the probability that the asset
value falls below the default barrier increases.
According toMerton (1974), under the assumption that the shareholders and debthold-
ers are rational, if at the end of the holding period the asset value is less than the
liabilities, zero-coupon bond, then shareholders get nothing, debtholders will seize
the firm, and they receive the asset value, VA. At the second possible scenario, asset
value is more than the liabilities then the residual value that is the difference be-
tween the total value of the firm and total liability value goes to shareholders and
debtholders receive the total debt. In other words, shareholders have limited lia-
bility on the firm. They cannot lose more than the asset value of the firm. When
the default happens, debtholders have senior claims on the asset value of the firm,
whereas shareholders rank after debtholders. Shareholders’ expected payoff can be
1Default line and default barrier is intechangeably used in this context.
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symbolized as:
ST =
VA,T −XT , if VA,T ≥ XT .0, otherwise. (2.18)
where ST is the payoff at the expiration date to the shareholder. XT represents the
face value of the debt and VA,T is the asset value of the firm.
Figure 2.6: The value of equity at maturity
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From the debtholder perspective, at the end of the holding period, they will get the
asset value of the firm or outstanding debt. In the case, the asset value is less than
debt; then the debtholders will get asset value; otherwise, they will receive the debt.
This payoff can be represented as:
PT =
VA,T , if VA,T ≤ XTXT , otherwise (2.19)
We can rewrite equation 2.19 as:
PT = min(VA,T , XT )
= XT −max(0, XT − VA,T )
= VA,T −max(VA,T −XT , 0)
(2.20)
26
Figure 2.7: The relationship between firm asset value and liabilities at maturity
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Risky debt can be shown in two ways, as equation 2.20 above tells us. The value of
risky debt is the value of assets minus short position on a call option on firm value.
The other equation says that the value of risky debt is the amount of debt minus
the short position on the put option. When the firm is in bad situation, shareholders
exercise the put option to give the firm to bondholders. At the same time, debtholders
also have the option to buy the firm from the shareholders.
The maximum amount that debtholders can take is the amount of debt as long as
the firm does not default. The firm that takes debt can pay if the asset value is more
than the liabilities. Otherwise, shareholders will transfer the firm’s asset value to
debtholder.
Payments caused by the liquidation of asset value is transferred with zero-cost to the
debtholders when the firm’s default is realized. At the heart of the model, is the fact
that the equity of the firm can be modelled like a European call option. The strike
price is the face value of the debt, X, and the maturity is T. This model’s structure
is akin to the payoff option. In Merton’s approach, at the maturity, actually, the
shareholders will get payment ET
ET = max(VA,T −X,O) (2.21)
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Table 2.1: Payoff Structure
Payoff
VA,T < XT VA,T > XT
Shareholder 0 VA,T −XT
Debtholder VA,T XT
This phenomenon proves that the debt structure of a typical firm is a call option that
the equity value is the underlying asset, and X is the strike price or the face value of
the debt. So the value of the equity resembles the value of a call option. Therefore,
the value of equity is:
ET = VA,TN(d1)−Xe−rTN(d2) (2.22)
where
d1 =
ln(VA
X
) + (µ+ 1
2
σ2A)T
σA
√
T
(2.23)
d2 =
ln(VA
X
) + (µ− 1
2
σ2A)T
σA
√
T
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T
(2.24)
The instantaneous volatility of the equity can be determined by using Ito’s lemma.
E0σE =
∂E
∂A
A0σA (2.25)
Call option’s strike price equals to the face of the value of the liabilities. In this
setup, the probability of default can be regarded as the probability that the option
expires worthless. We are trying to find the probability that the asset’s value of the
firm is less than the liabilities(Agarwal and Taffler, 2008).
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2.2.3 The Calculation of Probability of Default
The probability of default is that debtholders’ not using the option right at the time
maturity T. The implied probability of default can be calculated with the formula
presented below.
PD = N(− ln(
VA
X
) + (µ− ψ − 1
2
σ2AT )
σA
√
T
) (2.26)
where V represents the value of the firm,X is the debt of the firm, µ is the expected
return of the firm, ψ is the dividend rate defined as total dividend over the total
value of the firm given to shareholders, σA is the volatility of the asset and T is the
maturity.
Value of assets, the expected return of the firm and volatility of the asset cannot
be observed. In equation 2.26, VA and σA can differ in terms of calculation. For
example, Hillegeist et al. (2004) find the σA and VA by solving simultaneously 2.27
and 2.28 given below
VE = VAe
−ψTN(d1)−Xe−rTN(d2) + (1− e−ψT )VA (2.27)
σE =
VAe
−rTN(d1)σA
VE
(2.28)
where VE is the market value of equity, and σA is the standard deviation of the stock
returns. In equation 2.27, (1 − eψT ) means that shareholders get the dividends, so
it decreases the value of equity. But in our model, it is assumed that no dividend is
distributed.
VA is set initially as
VA = VE +X (2.29)
σA =
σE VE
VE +X
(2.30)
On the other side, Bharath and Shumway (2004) calculate asset volatility in a dif-
ferent way
σA =
VE
VA
σE +
X
VA
σD (2.31)
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Bharath and Shumway (2004) define the relationship between the volatility of debt
and the volatility of equity.
σD = 0.05 + 0.25σE (2.32)
Bharath and Shumway (2004) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) differ in picking suitable
expected return. Bharath and Shumway (2004) assume the expected return of the
firm is the risk-free rate. On the other side, Hillegeist et al. (2004) define the rele-
vant return as the past year’s return.
µ =
VA,t + ψ − VA,t−1
VA,t−1
(2.33)
Bharath and Shumway (2004) andHillegeist et al. (2004) assume the upper boundary
for µ as 100%.
Using which µ should be used is entirely arguable an in the literature, we can see
many alternatives. For example,Aktan (2011) chooses µ as the log return of implied
asset values. Vassalou and Xing (2004) take µ as annual returns of the firms, which
can be calculated as the mean of the change in the natural logarithm of the asset
value.
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) argue that using past returns as µ is problematic because
a distressed firm has more expected return than healthier firm due to carrying high
risk.
As stated above, X can be seen as the default barrier for the firm. Vassalou and
Xing (2004) determine X as short term plus the half long term debt. Picking X
affects the results. This implementation reduces the probability of default due to
reduced default barrier.
2.2.4 Determinants of Default
According to Kealhofer (2003), three variables are the main determinants for the
default. These are debt level, asset volatility, and asset value.
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Merton (1974)’s structural approach implies the liabilities, and asset value of the
firm determine the status of default. The primary determinant for the ability to the
repayment of the firm depends on the asset value of the firm. When expected asset
value increases, we can expect the firm pays more easily its debt.
The value of equity depends on firm value, asset volatility, the face value of debt,
maturity, and the risk-free rate. The market value of equity is inversely proportional
to the probability of default. When the market value of equity decreases, then the
probability of default increases. When the other variables are constant, the increase
in the leverage means the firm is riskier. That reduces the distance to default and in-
creases the probability of default. Things that rise asset value impact the probability
of default positively such as earnings expectations as Chan-Lau et al. (2004) stress,
this increases the distance to default. Also, if the expected asset volatility increases,
also, the probability of default increases. Likelihood of touching the default barrier
rises.
2.2.5 Concept of Distance to Default
Distance to default is how much standard deviation is far away from the default
barrier. When the distance to default increases, it implies that the firm gets away
from the default. DD is an ordinal measurement. Distance to default can be defined
as:
DD =
ln(VA
X
) + (µ− 1
2
σ2A)T
σA
√
T
(2.34)
According to Chan-Lau et al. (2004), the distance to default model permits us to
work with the risk-free rate instead of asset value drift. Therefore, µ can be re-
placed with the risk-free rate, rf .
DD =
ln(VA
X
) + (rf − 12σ2A)T
σA
√
T
(2.35)
The relationship between distance to default and the probability of default can be
constructed with the equation below.
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PD = N(−DD) (2.36)
In the literature, to derive PD, the assumption that the PD is normally distributed is
commonly held. Under this assumption, for instance, when we find DD=1, then we
can conclude that at maturity, the firm has a PD of 15%. The fact that the proba-
bility of default is distributed with standard normal distribution is problematic. For
instance, KMV uses its empirical databases to derive PD. Aktan (2011) claims that
the financial data, , generally leptokurtic, has leverage effect so, the model’s nor-
mality assumption can be replaced with t-distribution that has more fat-tailed.In this
case, the probability of default can be represented as:
PD = t(−DD) (2.37)
But the distance to default can be calculated via different methods. For example, as
Vassalou and Xing (2004) argue, KMV determines the distance to default as:
DD =
VA −DB
VAσA
(2.38)
where DB is the default barrier.
2.2.6 Advantages of the Model
When we compared the statistical-based and artificial intelligence models with the
Merton model, the fundamental difference is that the latter one is forward-looking.
This type of model is more sensitive to changes in the business environment. The
former is in nature, static and depends on static financial statements.
In theMertonmodel, themarket reflects all information speedily at securities’ prices.
Market-basedmodels are not time-dependent or sample dependent, contrary to acco-
unting-based models. The factors that affect credit risk is the same for all samples.
The model provides a robust theoretical framework for the default risk contrary to
other types such as statistical-based, artificial intelligence models.
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The additional confusion related to statistical-based models is about which vari-
ables should be added to the analysis. However, for market-based models, there is
no question about it.
2.2.7 Limitations of the Model
One of the critics made to Merton Model is that the assumption that the default can
only be realized at the maturity date. The basic model does not allow the default be-
fore the maturity date. That creates an awkward situation. For example, even until
the maturity, the asset value is zero, the firm can be recovered from this situation,
and this idea does not capture the real-life condition. So, there are studies that try
to relax this assumption. Black and Cox (1976)’s approach allows the firm the de-
fault before the maturity. Also, Tudela and Young (2003) create their model based
on the Merton model to measure the credit risk of the non-financial firms and relax
this assumption, and when asset value fall below default barrier first time, then the
default happens.
According to Vassalou and Xing (2004), Merton model assumes that the firm’s debt
structure consists of short term debt, long term debt, and equity, so it is simplified. To
get close to real life situation, KMV, in Merton’s commercial implementation, the
firm’s debt structure is allowed to include convertibles and preferred shares. The
second point is that Vassalou and Xing (2004) stress that the Merton model in cal-
culating asset volatility is much simpler than the KMVmethods that make Bayesian
adjustment according to country, industry, size, and so on.
The other problem is that in Merton’s approach, we can predict assuming the prob-
ability of default is normally distributed. To overcome this problem, for example,
KMV is calculating the probability of default from its own empirical database.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA
In a typical firm, we can not directly observe the market value of a firm. For traded
companies, we can observe equity value. We can observe the book value of the
assets but is often different from the market value. Hence, VA,T cannot be precisely
observed. Also, the same issue exists for the asset volatility. We cannot use the asset
value to forecast asset volatility. This relationship is derived from option pricing
theory. The following section describes how the parameters necessary to calculate.
The asset volatility and the asset value of a firm at time T, are obtained or calculated.
3.1 Parameters of the Model
3.1.1 Market Cap
The market value of equity of the firm is calculated as the product of shares price
and the number of shares outstanding. Both parameters are obtained from the same
database, Bloomberg Terminal. However, the data sequence before 1999was yearly,
after that year, it is obtained quarterly, and it is assumed that no change happens
about the number of shares outstanding between periods because of lack of the rel-
evant data. Also, market shares outstanding smoothed to average to see the price
effect only.
3.1.2 Liability and Default Barrier
As the market cap, the summation of short term and long term debt of the bank is
obtained quarterly via Bloomberg Terminal. Since there is no daily debt data, the
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cubic spline method is implemented to fill the missing data. The default barrier is
picked as the debt of banks, compliant with previous studies.
3.1.3 Risk-Free Rate
Since the period analyzed is too long; unfortunately, there is no unique risk free
rate that captures all the period. So, for the period between 1996 and 1998 the risk
free rate is assumed to be equal to customer price index published by TUIK and
for the period between 1998 and 2005, the risk-free rate is accepted to be equal
to the compound return of discounted bond issued monthly by Turkish Treasury is
accepted. Also, in somemonths, since thereweremore than one issue, the compound
return of bond nearest to 1 year is selected as the risk-free rate. Besides, the data is
monthly basis. Hence, to get the daily data, the cubic spline method is implemented
to fill missing data. For the period after 2005, the yield of the 1-year Treasury Bond
is obtained from the Bloomberg Terminal Data daily as daily data.
3.1.4 Maturity
The maturity is accepted as 1-year in parallel with the previous relevant studies.
3.1.5 Drift Rate
As a drift rate, the risk-free rate is picked up in this study. When estimating asset
drift, one of the alternatives is to use Capital Asset Pricing Method, but because in
our sample horizon is very long, the data availability and reliability are one of the
issues, and the model risk can arise. So, the risk-free rate is accepted as the drift rate
like Chan-Lau et al. (2004) do.
3.2 Structure of the Data
In this thesis, the distance to default is calculated for banks traded at BIST from
4th quarter of 1996 to last quarter of 2018, by making use of several data sources,
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the forecasting power of the Merton model about default and whether it is a good
predictor for the crisis is investigated.
Banks used in this thesis to test the theory is illustrated in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Banks used in this study
BANK STATUS TYPE PERIOD
1 YAPI KREDI NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1996Q4-2018Q4
2 ALBARAKA NON-FAILED PARTICIPATION PRIVATE 2008Q2-2018Q4
3 DENIZBANK NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 2005Q4-2018Q4
4 FINANSBANK NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1997Q4-2018Q4
5 FORTIS NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1997Q4-2010Q4
6 VAKIFBANK NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL STATE 2007Q1-2018Q4
7 ISBANK NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1996Q4-2018Q4
8 GARANTI NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1996Q4-2018Q4
9 HALKBANK NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL STATE 2008Q2-2018Q4
10 TOPRAKBANK FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1999Q2-2001Q2
11 AKBANK NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1996Q4-2018Q4
12 TEB NON-FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 2001Q2-2015Q2
13 TSKB NON-FAILED DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE 1996Q4-2018Q4
14 DEMIRBANK FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1996Q4-1999Q4
15 TUTUNBANK FAILED COMMERCIAL PRIVATE 1996Q4-1999Q4
16 ASYA KATILIM FAILED PARTICIPATION PRIVATE 2007Q2-2015Q3
The sample consists of 16 banks operated between 1996 and 2018 at BIST Banking
Index. 4 banks are captured by TMSF, and these banks are classified as failed banks.
Others are labelled as non-failed banks. Two of them are participation banks, one of
them is development bank and others can be classified as commercial banks. Our
sample size differs each year because of data availability and the status whether it
is traded at BIST or not. For example, ICBC and ESBANK are not included in our
sample since we did not reach reliable data about them. Table 3.2 shows the sample
size for each year examined.
3.2.1 Steps to Follow
I created a sheet at Excel for each quarter that captures last one year data. The neces-
sary variables for the model are market capitalization, book liabilities, risk-free rate,
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Table 3.2: Sample Size
YEAR 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
FAILED 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
NONFAILED 7 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 8 12
YEAR 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
FAILED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
NONFAILED 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10
closing price and the number of shares outstanding. Before the iteration process, we
need to manipulate the data.
The liability data is extracted from the balance sheet. However, the data is pub-
lished at the end of each quarter of the year. So, in this setup, the cubic spline is
implemented to fill the null data points like Chan-Lau et al. (2004) did. Existing
data points are created on a 3-month basis. The procedure is given below under the
example of Yapı Kredi. The sample data point is given in table 3.3. Such a table
is created with existing data points. Then with the help of RStudio Editor, the code
that is given below is run under xlsx package, and the spline function is used to in-
terpolate cubic spline. At table 3.3, the non-available numbers can be filled in this
way.
// Sample Code
library(xlsx)
mydata2<-read.xlsx("C:/Users/Sercan
Koyunlu/Desktop/YAPI.xlsx",sheetIndex =1 )
a<-spline(x=mydata2$INDEX, y = mydata2$LIABILITIES, n = 1, method =
"natural",xmin = 1, xmax = 5738)
write.xlsx(a,file="C:/Users/Sercan
Koyunlu/Desktop/YAPI_KREDI_CUBIC_RESULT.xlsx")
The risk-free rate that captures all year couldn’t be found. So, the data is divided into
three periods. Between 1996-1998, the risk-free rate is defined as the rate of change
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in 12 months moving averages published by the Turkish Statistical Agency.1 Be-
tween 1998-2004, from the Turkish Treasury website, the treasury bond is searched
that meets the criteria that its maturity is nearest to 1 year.2 Then the monthly risk-
free rate is created. To convert the monthly data to daily data again natural cubic
spline is implemented with the code that is run on R-Studio Editor.
After all the relevant data is collected, next stage is iteration. In solving the iteration
process, the methods that are described by Löeffler and Posch (2007) are adopted.
According to Löeffler and Posch (2007), we have two options to reach asset volatil-
ity and value. In the first option, the primary aim is to reach unknows, asset volatility
and asset value from knowns, equity value and equity volatility at the end of each
quarter by solving equation 2.22, equation 2.23, equation 2.24, equation 2.25 simul-
taneously with the help of Excel Solver. The details will be explained via a concrete
example by looking Yapi Kredi fourth quarter of 2018. At the end of this period, the
equity value is 13515, the equity volatility is about 39%, the risk-free rate is 19.94%,
liabilities are 334.370 and maturity is one year. As the sum of equity value and lia-
bilities are assigned in this case the initial asset value is 347.885 and the initial asset
value is computed from the equation
V0 =
σEE0
A0
=
13.515
347.885
39%
(3.1)
In this way, we assign the initial asset value as 347.885 and initial asset volatility
as 1.53%, inferred from equation 3.1 . By using these inputs and by using Black-
Scholes formulas, equation 2.23, equation 2.24, equation 2.22, and 2.25 we find d1,
d2 and ET and σE . The aim is to minimize the square of equity value derived from
Black Scholes formulas over the real equity value minus 1 and the square of the eq-
uity volatility derived from Black Scholes from the actual equity volatility minus 1.
After we get all this data, the excel solver function is run. After running, estimated
1TUIK
2https://www.hmb.gov.tr/kamu-finansmani-istatistikleri
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asset value and estimated asset volatility is found.
According to Löeffler and Posch (2007), the second alternative procedure is to solve
the equation system.
At =
Et + Lte
−rt(T−t)N(d2)
N(d1)
At−1 =
Et−1 + Lt−1e−rt−1(T−(t−1))N(d2)
N(d1)
....
At−n+1 =
Et−n+1 + Lt−n+1e(−rt−n+1(T−(t−n+1))N(d2)
N(d1)
At−n =
Et−n + Lt−ne(−rt−n(T−(t−n))N(d2)
N(d1)
(3.2)
We assign the initial asset value as the sum of the liabilities and the market value on
a daily basis. According to equation 3.2, we find new asset values to iterate. Daily
initial asset values are found, and new asset values are tried to be found by the Black
Scholes formula. Since the Black Scholes formula is not in Excel, the function is
embedded in Excel with the macro.
// Function
Function Bsd(V, X, R_f, 1, sigma)
'V is asset value, X is the liability, T is the time horizon
'r risk-free rate, sigma is asset volatility underlying
Bsd = (Log(V / X) + (r_f + 0.5 * ˆsigma2) * T) / (sigma * T ^ 0.5)
End Function
The new asset value is derived for each day from initial asset value, and the log
returns of new asset values are found, and the asset volatility is calculated from the
new asset value series implied by models. And the sum of the squared difference
of two series is found by SUMX2Y2 formula. And again the code given below is
created to iterate the process.
Sub new_iterative()
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lastrow = Cells(Rows.Count, "B").End(xlUp).Row
For i = 1 To 250
If Range("L6").Value > 0.000001 Then
Range("I3:I" & lastrow).Value = Range("j3:j" & lastrow).Value
End If
Next
End Sub
In this code if the difference between the square of asset values and the derived
asset values is bigger than 0.000001, the derived assets is copied to the initial series
if again the difference is bigger than 0.000001 then again copied, the procedure is
again repeated until the difference converges to 0.000001.
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Table 3.3: Cubic Spline Interpolation-YAPI KREDI-2018-Q4
INDEX DATE LIABILITIES LIABILITIES CUBIC
1 31.12.1995 7,890 7,890
... ... ... ...
100 03.06.1996 N/A 8,802
... ... ... ...
245 26.12.1996 9,773 9,773
... ... ... ...
497 31.12.1997 11,511 11,511
... ... ... ...
1000 01.02.2000 N/A 8,802
... ... .. ...
1844 30.06.2003 20,264 20,264
... ... .. ...
1910 30.09.2003 21,151 21,151
... ... .. ...
1969 31.12.2003 22,251 22,251
... ... .. ...
2000 19.02.2004 N/A 21,558
... ... ... ...
3662 30.09.2010 71,811 71,811
... ... ... ...
3723 31.12.2010 82,131 82,131
... ... ... ...
5000 26.01.2016 N/A 210,203
... ... ... ...
5487 29.12.2017 289,965 289,965
... ... ... ...
5551 30.03.2018 297,088 297,088
... ... ... ...
5613 29.06.2018 327,261 327,261
... ... ... ...
5673 28.09.2018 381,669 381,669
... ... ... ...
5700 07.11.2018 N/A 373,912
... ... ... ...
5738 31.12.2018 334,370 334,370
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In the first step, asset volatility and distance to default numbers produced for the
banking sector and for the banks will be presented for analyzed years.
In the second step of this section, it is investigated whether the Merton Model is
a good predictor of the financial failure at the specific level of banks and also the
behaviour of the distance to default is investigated around the crises occurred during
the Turkish Economy Crisis.
4.1 Specific Results
4.1.1 Non-failed Banks
4.1.1.1 Akbank
Akbank is one of the private commercial banks analyzed and one of the greatest
banks in Turkey. 89 DD points are obtained. In figure 4.1, the historical mean of
DD is 2.66. Minimum DD found is 0.99, and it realized in the last quarter of 1996.
Maximum DD number observed is 4.81, and it is achieved in the third quarter of
2017. For the period between 1996 and 2001, we can see the effects of the 2001
economic crisis. DD is almost below two each year in this period, and DD is unsta-
ble. After the crisis, as it is expected, DD gets larger, and DD reaches peak number
during 2007 period, after that period, with increasing effect of the global crisis, we
see a decreasing trend between 2007 and 2009. After 2009, the unstable pattern is
observed but increasing direction of DD outweighs. After, currency speculation cri-
sis, we observe that DD decreases from about 4.3 to 2.8. Foreign currency liability
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in the balance sheet affects the debt level of the bank.
When we look at the asset volatility trend, the inclination is continually downward.
It decreases significantly from 70% level to about 10%.In figure 4.2, historical asset
volatility is 17.52%. Minimum asset volatility observed is 2.87%, and it realized in
the second quarter of 2018. Maximum asset volatility seen is 67.59%, and it realized
in the last quarter of 1996.
Figure 4.1: Akbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.2: Akbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.2 Albaraka
Albaraka is one of the private participation banks analyzed and one of the greatest
participation banks in Turkey in terms of asset sizes in Turkey. 43 DD points are
obtained. In figure 4.3, the historical mean of DD is 3.51. Minimum DD number is
2.18, and it realized in the third quarter of 2018. Maximum DD number is 5.09, and
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it is accomplished in the third quarter of 2017. The increasing profit with the help of
credit guarantee fund in this period can be a factor affecting DD positively. It can be
observed that the global 2008 crisis has limited effect onAlbaraka and its DD spans
between 3 and 4 in a stable way. For the period 2013 and 2018, the increasing trend
can be seen, but after this period, DD reduces significantly from about 4 to almost
2. This reflects the increase in riskiness due to last currency speculation crisis.
In figure 4.4, historical asset volatility is 3.35%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 0.87%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2017. Maximum asset volatility
number is 8.04%, and it realized in the second quarter of 2017. When the asset
volatility numbers are analyzed, it shows the same pattern with other banks. Asset
volatility of Albaraka is maximum in the second quarter of 2010 and minimum in
the third quarter of 2017. But there is no significant move at asset volatility, and it
spans between 1% and 8%.
Figure 4.3: Albaraka-Distance to Default
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Figure 4.4: Albaraka-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.3 Denizbank
Denizbank is one of the private commercial banks analyzed. 53 DD points are ob-
tained. In figure 4.5, the historical mean of DD is 2.43. Minimum DD observed is
0.85, and it realized in the second quarter of 2009. Maximum DD observed is 4.92,
and it realized in the last quarter of 2014. The striking feature is that its DD and asset
volatilities is more unstable when compared to other banks. 53 DD points are ob-
tained. The decreasing trend of DD can be seen until 2012. It is thought that around
this date, they are sold to Sberbank so this can have an impact on DD numbers. After
selling, the increasing trend of DD can be seen until 2016. Like the other banks, the
recent currency speculation crisis has reversed the trend of DD negatively.
In figure 4.6, historical asset volatility is 8.81%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 1.31%, and it realized in the second quarter of 2015. Maximum asset volatility
number is 24.89%, and it realized in the last quarter of 2018. Additionally, asset
volatility is also more unstable compared to other banks.
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Figure 4.5: Denizbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.6: Denizbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.4 Finansbank
Finansbank is one of the private commercial banks analyzed. 85 DD points are ob-
tained. The historical mean of DD is 2.32. Minimum DD observed is 0.54, and it
realized in the last quarter of 1997. MaximumDD observed is 4.95, and it is accom-
plished in the first quarter of 2008. DD numbers are very volatile as the other banks.
For the period 1997 and 2008, there is a steady increase in DD numbers, except for
the 2001 crisis. After this period, the more volatile pattern in DD is observed until
the current period. But in the last periods, the inclination in DD trend is decreasing
showing the increasing riskiness.
In figure 4.8, asset volatility is somewhat volatile, compared to other banks. And, af-
ter the second period of 2018, the increasing trend realizes. Historical asset volatility
is 10.92%. Minimum asset volatility observed is 3.19%, and it realized in the first
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quarter of 2015. Maximum asset volatility observed is 4.95, and it realized in the
last quarter of 1997.
Figure 4.7: Finansbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.8: Finansbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.5 Fortis
Fortisbank is one of the private commercial banks analyzed. Its commercial name
was Disbank before Fortis purchased Disbank in 2005. FortisbankA.S was acquired
by TEB in 2011. 53 DD points are obtained. In figure 4.9, the historical mean of
DD is 2.00. Minimum DD number is 0.95, and it realized in the last quarter of
1998. Maximum DD number is 3.40, and it is achieved in the first quarter of 2006.
This point is interesting because it realized after the sale of Disbank. And the other
interesting rise in DD happened before the takeover by TEB.
In figure 4.10, historical asset volatility is 12.30%. Minimum asset volatility number
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is 3.85%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2003. Maximum asset volatility
number is 35.81%, and it realized in the last quarter of 1997.
Figure 4.9: Fortis-Distance to Default
Figure 4.10: Fortis-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.6 Garanti
Garanti is one of the private commercial banks analyzed and one of the greatest
banks in terms of asset sizes in Turkey. 89 DD points are obtained. In figure 4.11,
the historical mean of DD is 2.31. Minimum DD number is -0.20, and it realized in
the last quarter of 1997. Maximum DD number is 4.55, and it is accomplished in
the third quarter of 2017. For the period between 1996 and 2006, incremental DD
can be observed. After then until 2009, the decreasing trend in DD realized until
the middle of 2009. After then, the ups and downs in DD can be seen. Again like
the other banks, the loans collateralized by KGF helped the boost the profits, and
48
this gave a positive contribution to DD number again last currency speculation crisis
reversed the trend again, and the significant decline in DD numbers happened.
In figure 4.12, historical asset volatility is 16%. Minimum asset volatility number is
3.11%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2017. Maximum asset volatility number
is 115.05%, and it realized in the third quarter of 1997.
Figure 4.11: Garanti Bankasi-Distance to Default
Figure 4.12: Garanti Bankasi-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.7 Halkbank
Halkbank is one of the state commercial banks analyzed and one of the greatest
banks in terms of asset sizes in Turkey. 43 DD points are obtained. In figure 4.13,
the historical mean of DD is 2.68. Minimum DD number is 1.39, and it realized in
the last quarter of 2008. Maximum DD number is 3.65, and it is achieved in the last
quarter of 2012. Its DD is rather unstable in last periods and has more peak points
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and deeper points due to the case sued at the US to Halkbank. Also again, like the
other banks are affected by currency crisis speculation.
In figure 4.14, historical asset volatility is 16%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 1.24%, and it realized in the second quarter of 2018. Maximum asset volatility
number is 11.66%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2009.
Figure 4.13: Halkbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.14: Halkbank-Asset Volatlity
4.1.1.8 Isbank
Isbank is one of the private commercial banks analyzed and one of the greatest banks
in terms of asset sizes in Turkey. 89 DD points are obtained. In figure 4.15, the
historical mean of DD is 2.55. Minimum DD number is 1.22, and it realized in the
last quarter of 1997. Maximum DD number is 4.38, and it is accomplished in the
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third quarter of 2017. It seems that again last currency speculation crisis has an
impact on the decline in DD and also the agenda on Isbank’s transfer to Treasury
also affected DD numbers negatively.
In figure 4.16, historical asset volatility is 14.12%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 1.82%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2018. Maximum asset volatility
number is 55.26%, and it realized in the first quarter of 2001.
Figure 4.15: Isbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.16: Isbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.9 TEB
TEB is one of the private commercial banks analyzed. 57 DD points are obtained.
In figure 4.17, the historical mean of DD is 2.46. Minimum DD number is 1.08,
and it realized in the third quarter of 2001. Maximum DD number is 6.18, and it is
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achieved in the first quarter of 2015. Actually, TEB has more stable DD pattern than
the other banks. It seems that the decision about quitting from BIST has affected
DD numbers positively.
In figure 4.18, historical asset volatility is 7.64%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 1.61%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2014. Maximum asset volatility
number is 40.66%, and it realized in the first quarter of 2001.
Figure 4.17: TEB-Distance to Default
Figure 4.18: TEB-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.10 Vakifbank
Vakifbank is one of the state commercial banks analyzed. 48DD points are obtained.
In figure 4.19, the historical mean of DD is 2.74. Minimum DD number is 1.53,
and it realized in the last quarter of 2008. Maximum DD number is 3.88, and it is
accomplished in the third quarter of 2017. For the periods between 2007 and 2009,
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the trend is decreasing and then is usually upward again last period conditions that
are experienced reversed the trend negatively.
In figure 4.20, historical asset volatility is 4.18%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 1.40%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2018. Maximum asset volatility
number is 10.66%, and it realized in the first quarter of 2007.
Figure 4.19: Vakifbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.20: Vakifbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.11 Yapi Kredi
YapiKredi is one of the private commercial banks analyzed. Like the other banks,
DD has an unstable pattern. 89 DD points are obtained. In figure 4.21, the historical
mean of DD is 2.40. Minimum DD number is 0.79, and it realized in the first quar-
ter of 2003. Maximum DD number is 3.95, and it is achieved in the third quarter of
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2017. For the period 1996 and 2001, DD is relatively lower. For the period 2002 and
2006, the trend for DD is increasing. In 2008, with the global crisis, DD levels in
one of the deepest levels. Then around 2017, the loan collateralized by Credit Guar-
antee Fund boost the profit of the sector in general, so it affected DD positively, and
after last currency speculation, like the other banks, the DD is affected negatively.
In figure 4.22, historical asset volatility is 14.38%. Minimum asset volatility num-
ber is 1.86%, and it realized in the last quarter of 2018. Maximum asset volatility
number is 64.30%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2000.
Figure 4.21: Yapı Kredi-Distance to Default
Figure 4.22: Yapı Kredi-Asset Volatility
4.1.1.12 TSKB
TSKB is one of the private development banks analyzed. 89 DD points are obtained.
In figure 4.23, the historical mean of DD is 2.36. Minimum DD number is -0.05,
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and it realized in the last quarter of 1996. Maximum DD number is 4.71, and it is
accomplished in the last quarter of 2017.
In figure 4.24, historical asset volatility is 12.51%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 2.39%, and it realized in the second quarter of 2018. Maximum asset volatility
number is 71.64%, and it realized in the third quarter of 1997.
Figure 4.23: TSKB-Distance to Default
Figure 4.24: TSKB-Asset Volatility
4.1.2 Failed Banks
Among failed banks, Asya Katilim was private participation bank, and the others
were private commercial bank. As Gropp et al. (2006) stress, the DD numbers in-
creases just before the default. But before, there is significant decrease happens up
to 12 months.
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4.1.2.1 Asya Katilim
Asya Katilim is one of the failed private participation banksanalyzed. 34 DD points
are obtained. In figure 4.25, the historical mean of DD is 2.59. Minimum DD num-
ber is 1.04, and it realized in the second quarter of 2015. Maximum DD number is
4.22, and it is achieved in the last quarter of 2012.
In figure 4.26, historical asset volatility is 7.23%. Minimum asset volatility num-
ber is 2.14%, and it realized in the last quarter of 2013. Maximum asset volatility
number is 15.5%, and it realized in the third quarter of 2007.
Figure 4.25: Asya Katılım-Distance to Default
Figure 4.26: Asya Katılım-Asset Volatility
4.1.2.2 Demirbank
Demirbank is one of the failed private commercial banks analyzed. 13 DD points are
obtained. In figure 4.27, the historical mean of DD is 1.38. Minimum DD number
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is 1.03, and it realized in the last quarter of 1997. Maximum DD number is 2.47,
and it is accomplished in the first quarter of 1997.
In figure 4.28, historical asset volatility is 25.93%. Minimum asset volatility number
is 8.76%, and it realized in the third quarter of 1999. Maximum asset volatility
number is 52.79%, and it realized in the first quarter of 1998.
Figure 4.27: Demirbank-Distance To Default
Figure 4.28: Demirbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.2.3 Toprakbank
Toprakbank is one of the failed private commercial banks analyzed. 9 DD points are
obtained. In figure 4.29, the historical mean of DD is 1.03. Minimum DD number
is 0.63, and it realized in the last quarter of 2000. Maximum DD number is 1.55,
and it is achieved in the last quarter of 1999.
In figure 4.30, historical asset volatility is 8.91%. Minimum asset volatility number
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is 4.76%, and it realized in the second quarter of 2001. Maximum asset volatility
number is 14.65%, and it realized in the first quarter of 2001.
Figure 4.29: Toprakbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.30: Toprakbank-Asset Volatility
4.1.2.4 Tutunbank
Tutunbank is one of the failed private commercial banks analyzed. 13 DD points are
obtained. In figure 4.31, the historical mean of DD is 1.44. Minimum DD number
is 0.60, and it realized in the second quarter of 1999. Maximum DD number is 2.24,
and it is accomplished in the first quarter of 1998. In figure 4.32, historical asset
volatility is 23.11%. Minimum asset volatility number is 9.99%, and it realized
in the third quarter of 1999. Maximum asset volatility number is 49.86%, and it
realized in the third quarter of 1998.
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Figure 4.31: Tutunbank-Distance to Default
Figure 4.32: Tutunbank-Asset Volatility
4.2 General Results for Turkish Banking Sector
In this section, the overall results will be given for the Turkish Banking sector for
the periods analyzed, and the asset volatility and distance to default implied by the
model will be investigated looking at stress periods. The sector analysis is based
on the average of DD numbers and asset volatility of the banks analyzed for each
period.
Figure 4.33 shows the estimation of the distance to default of the Turkish Banking
sector based on the Merton Structural Approach. The lower the distance to default
means the higher probability of default that in turn, shows more riskiness. Accord-
ing to figure 4.33, the minimum distance default has realized in the last quarter of
1997 and the third quarter of 2001. That indicates that the global or local economic
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Figure 4.33: Turkish Banking Sector-Distance to Default
environment conditions affect the healthiness of the banking sector. It is considered
that these numbers are related to the Asian Crisis and the Turkish Banking Crisis
experienced in 2001. The other striking feature of figure 4.33, again the distance to
default statistics experienced significant drop at 2008 global crisis and according to
figure 4.33, while at the second quarter of 2007, distance to default is approximately
three, it dropped at the level of 1.65 at the last quarter of 2008. Again it is observed
that the sensitivity to stress events is so high. For example, the abrupt increase in
USD/TRY during the second period of 2018 accompanies with a sharp decrease in
distance to default. In light of this information, the distance to default make quick
reaction to stressful events, and it can be useful to monitor the overall riskiness of
the banking sector. But the other important question is the model can give some
information in advance.
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Figure 4.34: Asset Volatility-Turkish Banking Sector
When we look at figure 4.34, the asset volatility implied by the model can be ob-
served. This statistic is produced from equity volatility. The first striking feature is
that asset volatility is more stable than the distance to default. Again, at the height of
the Asian crisis and the 2001 Turkish Banking crisis, asset volatility for the Turkish
Banking sector is somewhat higher than the other periods. In stress events, it reacts
but is not as fast as the distance to default statistic, and it spans around 5% at recent
periods.
4.3 Forecasting Power of The Distance to Default
The strength of the forecasting power of the model will be tested by looking at de-
fault for banks and the significant events of the Turkish economy. Since the period
analyzed is very long term, it includes many financial stress events such as 02/2001
Banking crisis, 09/2008 global crisis, 06/2013 internal affairs, and current volatility
hike in currency rate also in this period, 5 banks went bankrupt and was captured
by TMSF1. The behaviour of the model’s input, DD and asset volatility will be an-
alyzed around these events.
1ESBANK is excluded since the reliable data is not found
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The bank default is defined as TMSF capture and the default time is defined as
delisting of the bank from BIST Banking index.
4.3.1 Statistical Test of Indicators
Firstly, the sample is divided into two groups based on the criteria the default hap-
pened or not for each period and the null hypothesis 1 is tested. The test will be
performed with the help of E-views 9. Whether the behaviour of DD is differently
behaving will be performed via Satterthwaite-Welch t-test. Welch t-test is similar to
t-test but it has some differences. It is preferred when samples have unequal vari-
ances and unequal sample sizes. Welch t-statistic is:
t =
X1 −X2√
s21
N1
+
s22
N2
(4.1)
where X1 and X2 represent the mean of the samples and s21 and s
2
2 represent the
variance of the samples and N1 and N2 are the sample sizes.
Null Hypothesis 1= The mean of DD is equal between failed banks and non-failed
banks
Alternative Hypothesis 1= The mean of DD is not equal between failed banks and
non-failed banks
Table 4.1: The Test Results of Difference of the Means Between Failed and Non-
failed Banks
3 6 9 12
Mean Value
Non-Failed Banks 2.342412 2.466894 2.446959 2.297885
Failed Banks 1.224854 0.948091 1.006267 1.163888
t-statistic -4.38167 -4.65334 -4.77668 -4.47128
p-value 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
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According to table 4.1, DD of failed banks is significantly lower than DD of non-
failed banks for each horizon. The results suggest that DD can be used as an early
warning indicator for 3-months, 6-months, 9-months and 12- months. The differ-
ence between failed and non-failed banks are significantly important at 1% signif-
icance level because the p-value is lower than 1%. In other words, the DD gives a
signal about the increasing riskiness in advance. In this way, we can say the change
in DD can be an indicator of failure on bank level.
In the second step, the forecasting of crises strength of the model is investigated, fol-
lowing the same steps. However, firstly we identify stress events for Turkey. These
are 2001 banking crises, 2008 global crises, and lastly 2018 increase in currency
volatility.
Similarly, again behaviour of DD will be analyzed around these events. According
to results produced, DD gives different signals before each stress events.
DD does not differ significantly around the 2001 crisis. According to table 4.2,
Welsch t-test p-values for all lags is higher than the 10% significance level. How-
ever, it is considered that the Turkish economy before 2001 was already experienc-
ing a crisis for a long time. For example, at 1997 Asian crisis emerged then after
1999 earthquake was experienced and at 2000 IMF deal was made and the economy
was already in turbulence, so it is normal not to be able to differentiate between DD
numbers. Already, the asset volatility implied by the model is approximately 60%
between 1996 and 2001.
When the DD numbers are analyzed before the 2008 global crisis, according to ta-
ble 4.3, all Welsch t-test probabilities are lower than 10% significance. It seems that
there is significant differentiation at DD numbers for all lags.
Like the 2008 global crisis results, for recent currency speculation crisis, according
to table 4.4, allWelsch t-test statistics is lower than 10% significance level. Again, it
seems that DD results before the crisis and DD results around crisis are statistically
different.
All in all, the DD is a good indicator for forecasting bank failure but related to fore-
casting crisis is inconclusive. Although DD is significantly different for 2008 and
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2018 crisis, for the 2001 crisis, there is not proof that DD is statistically different.
In addition to this, when it is compared to 3-month lag probability is significantly
higher than 12-month lag probability.2 DD sometimes gives a strong signal at least
10% significance level.
Table 4.2: Summary of Welsch t-test Results-2001 Crisis
Stress Event lag df Value Probability
2001 Crisis 3-month 13.63011 −0.766559 0.4564
2001 Crisis 6-month 14.99805 0.189219 0.8525
2001 Crisis 9-month 11.44701 0.064792 0.9495
2001 Crisis 12-month 12.27820 0.004143 0.9968
Table 4.3: Summary of Welsch t-test Results-2008 Global Crisis
Stress Event lag df Value Probability
2008 Crisis 3-Month 18.37153 2.013234 0.0590
2008 Crisis 6-month 12.92020 1.970278 0.0706
2008 Crisis 9-month 19.93811 3.828683 0.0011
2008 Crisis 12-month 19.86145 3.995960 0.0007
Table 4.4: Summary of Welsch t-test Results-2018 Currency Volatility Hike
Stress Event lag df Value Probability
2018 Crisis 3-month 13.30369 2.051421 0.0605
2018 Crisis 6-month 12.64374 3.215456 0.0070
2018 Crisis 9-month 12.90418 3.789781 0.0023
2018 Crisis 12-month 11.76570 −4.749161 0.0005
4.3.2 In Sample Forecasting
The predictive power of the model for the default status is also tested with logit and
probit model. Since the default status takes binary values, 0 or 1, when the bank is
in the default, it can be labelled as 1, otherwise 0. The logit model can be shown as:
P(Default = 1 | DD) = exp(β0 + β1DD)
1 + exp(β0 + β1DD)
(4.2)
2The detailed results associated with other stress events will also be presented in the Appendix
section.
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The probit regression model can be shown as:
Pi =
∫ x0
−∞
1√
2pi
e
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (4.3)
The difference between probit and logit model is that whereas in the probit model
dependent variable is normally distributed, in the logit model the dependent variable
depends on the logistic curve. According to Chan-Lau et al. (2004), in the equation
4.2, βmeasures the strength of the DD to predict future credit events. When the logit
and probit regression inputs are meaningful, then the relationship between them can
be created.
The main point is to find the PD values given DD. Thanks to logit and probit regres-
sion, the PD value spans between 0% and 100% and the PD and DD relation is not
linear. When DD gets larger, then PD gets more slowly closer to 1. (Gujarati, 2016)
To create the logit regression model and probit regression model 832 data points for
each model are used. If the bank is in default, previous data points for relevant lag
was labelled as 1, the other observations are labelled as 0. In Eviews, logit and probit
regression is estimated. Covariance method is chosen as Huber-White as Chan-Lau
et al. (2004) did.
According to table 4.5, table 4.6, for all lags, DD is significant at least 1% sig-
nificance of level. When DD increases then it is expected that PD decreases. For
example, for 12 lag at logit regression, DD increase by 1 point, the logit value will
decrease by 2.218946 points.
Also, LR statistics are given in table 4.7. LR statistics is the equivalence of F-
statistics at linear regression models. LR statistics can be used to test the overall
significance of the model and is distributed with chi-square. The degrees of free-
dom is the number of the explanatory variable. So in this case degrees of freedom is
1. At the 1% significance level, the critical value for LR statistics is 6.635. Accord-
ing to the table 4.7, for all logit and probit regression for all lags, the LR statistics
is higher than the critical value so it is concluded that the logit and probit models
are meaningful at 1% significance of level. Also, this implies low p-values for the
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models. According to results, the DD is an important determinant for PD.
By using logit model, it is possible to find PD when DD is input. For instance when
DD is 1, then we can forecast PD as approximately equal to 4%, when DD is 2, then
PD is almost 0.7%. All in all, the probit and logit model can be useful for construct-
ing the relationship between PD and DD. The results show that DD gives a signal
before failure 12-months, 9-month, 6-month and 3-month in advance. The DD can
be a useful early warning indicator for the failure so it can be used to surveil the
banks and monitor the riskiness of banks. It also can create room for maneuver for
troubled banks.
Table 4.5: Probit Regression Results
Probit Regression-3 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −0.759825 0.151477 −5.016105 0.0000
C −0.932170 0.240091 −3.882567 0.0001
Probit Regression-6 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −0.950500 0.163577 −5.810715 0.0000
C −0.495396 0.288728 −1.715785 0.0862
Probit Regression-9 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −1.076952 0.171766 −6.269892 0.0000
C −0.189446 0.290260 −0.652675 0.5140
Probit Regression-12 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −1.137152 0.166008 −6.849971 0.0000
C 0.008732 0.283723 0.030775 0.9754
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Table 4.6: Logit Regression Results
Logit Regression-3 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −1.703773 0.282323 −6.034848 0.0000
C −1.462322 0.563052 −2.597133 0.0094
Logit Regression-6 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −1.993731 0.319590 −6.238396 0.0000
C −0.654807 0.562281 −1.164554 0.2442
Logit Regression-9 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −2.164977 0.415358 −5.212311 0.0000
C −0.118635 0.579380 −0.204763 0.8378
Logit Regression-12 month Lag
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
DD −2.218946 0.325043 −6.826621 0.0000
C 0.208883 0.554575 0.376655 0.7064
Table 4.7: LR Statistics of The Models
Lag Probit Regression Logit Regression
3-month 16.46591 15.27958
6-month 30.30648 28.36770
9-month 43.87647 41.16336
12-month 55.22174 51.65666
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CONCLUSIONSAND SUGGESTIONS
In a banking system, any bank entering default stage can create trouble for the whole
sector due to the increase in systemic dimension. For this reason, the banking
sector must be highly supervised. Traditionally, for the Turkish Banking system,
accounting-based models and artificial intelligence methods are suggested to mea-
sure riskiness. The studies based on market-based models measure the riskiness of
the Turkish Banking sector are limited. Hence, the main aim of this thesis is to con-
tribute to this limited literature on this subject by analyzing a long term period in the
Turkish economy.
In this thesis, the alternative measurement of the Turkish banking sector riskiness
is put forward by measuring DD for the banking system and for each bank. DD
shows how much the bank is far away from the default based on Merton’s structural
approach. Lower the DD means higher the probability of default.
The sample in the thesis includes 16 banks traded at BIST between 1996 and 2018.
According to the findings, DD can forecast the bank failure up to 12 months. Also,
constructing the probit and logit model, it is investigated whether the relationship
between DD and PD could be mapped. It is concluded that the logit and probit mod-
els are significant at 1% significance level at all lags analyzed.
It is thought that DD can be a useful earlywarning indicator for tracking andmonitor-
ing bank riskiness. Because it reacts more quickly than ratings or accounting-based
measures.
Also, according to our results, due to measures taken after the 2001 crisis, the asset
volatility implied by the model decreased from range 60%-80% to 5%-10%. The
other conclusion drawn is that last volatility hike in currency significantly decreased
DD for each bank and the sector. According to results, banks that have the lowest
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riskiness are Albaraka Turk, TSKB, and Yapı Kredi, the banks that have the highest
riskiness are Denizbank, Finansbank and Isbank.
On the other hand, the model has some weaknesses. Mapping DD is controversial
in the literature, and there is no unique implementation. For example, most authors
prefer to use mapping by using the normal distribution. Some authors, like Aktan
(2011) suggest t-distribution in mapping. KMV uses its own databases using histor-
ically true probability default. Some argue that like Chan-Lau et al. (2004) did, in
this paper, logit and probit regression are better alternatives in mapping. This study
follows the latter researches and constructs logit and probit regression in mapping
DD to reach PD. Some authors, likeAktan (2011) suggest t-distribution in mapping.
The second weakness is that the results depend on the iteration procedure chosen.
The iteration procedure chosen changes dramatically DD results.
The third weakness is that the model does not look at off-balance sheet activities.
Also, we cannot neglect the importance of off-balance sheet activities in today’s
world, so it must be integrated into the model in some way. Also, in this paper, the
constant interest rates assumption is relaxed to close real world.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: 2001 Crisis-Test Of Equality before 12 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 15 0.003996 0.9969
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 12.27820 0.004143 0.9968
Anova F-test (1, 15) 1.60E − 05 0.9969
Welch F-test* (1, 12.2782) 1.72E − 05 0.9968
Table A2: 2001 Crisis-Test Of Equality before 9 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 15 0.062179 0.9512
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 11.44701 0.064792 0.9495
Anova F-test (1, 15) 0.003866 0.9512
Welch F-test* (1, 11.447) 0.004198 0.9495
Table A3: 2001 Crisis-Test Of Equality before 6 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 15 0.187609 0.8537
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 14.99805 0.189219 0.8525
Anova F-test (1, 15) 0.035197 0.8537
Welch F-test* (1, 14.998) 0.035804 0.8525
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Table A4: 2001 Crisis-Test Of Equality before 3 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 15 −0.746085 0.4671
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 13.63011 −0.766559 0.4564
Anova F-test (1, 15) 0.556643 0.4671
Welch F-test* (1, 13.6301) 0.587612 0.4564
Table A5: 2008 Global Crisis-Test Of Equality before Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 22 2.013234 0.0565
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 18.37153 2.013234 0.0590
Anova F-test (1, 22) 4.053111 0.0565
Welch F-test* (1, 18.3715) 4.053111 0.0590
Table A6: 2008 Global Crisis-Test Of Equality before 6 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 20 2.082687 0.0503
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 12.92020 1.970278 0.0706
Anova F-test (1, 20) 4.337586 0.0503
Welch F-test* (1, 12.9202) 3.881997 0.0706
Table A7: 2008 Global Crisis-Test Of Equality before 9 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 20 3.779715 0.0012
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 19.93811 3.828683 0.0011
Anova F-test (1, 20) 14.28624 0.0012
Welch F-test* (1, 19.9381) 14.65881 0.0011
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Table A8: 2008 Global Crisis-Test Of Equality before 12 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 20 3.955132 0.0008
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 19.86145 3.995960 0.0007
Anova F-test (1, 20) 15.64307 0.0008
Welch F-test* (1, 19.8614) 15.96770 0.0007
Table A9: 2018 Currency Volatility Hike-Test Of Equality before 3 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 18 2.051421 0.0551
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 13.30369 2.051421 0.0605
Anova F-test (1, 18) 4.208328 0.0551
Welch F-test* (1, 13.3037) 4.208328 0.0605
Table A10: 2018 Currency Volatility Hike-Test Of Equality before 6 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 18 3.215456 0.0048
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 12.64374 3.215456 0.0070
Anova F-test (1, 18) 10.33916 0.0048
Welch F-test* (1, 12.6437) 10.33916 0.0070
Table A11: 2018 Currency Volatility Hike-Test Of Equality before 9 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 18 3.789781 0.0013
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 12.90418 3.789781 0.0023
Anova F-test (1, 18) 14.36244 0.0013
Welch F-test* (1, 12.9042) 14.36244 0.0023
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Table A12: 2018 Currency Volatility Hike-Test Of Equality before 12 Months
Method df Value Probability
t-test 18 −4.749161 0.0002
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 11.76570 −4.749161 0.0005
Anova F-test (1, 18) 22.55453 0.0002
Welch F-test* (1, 11.7657) 22.55453 0.0005
Table A13: Distance to Default-Turkish Banks-First Part
DATE YAPI FINANS FORTIS ISBANK GARANT AKBANK TSKB TEB
1996-4 1.53 1.54 1.09 0.99 -0.05
1997-1 1.56 1.27 1.06 1.77 0.42
1997-2 1.70 1.26 -0.12 2.06 0.23
1997-3 1.88 1.33 0.04 2.08 0.11
1997-4 1.65 0.54 1.13 1.22 -0.21 2.04 0.08
1998-1 2.09 1.30 1.13 1.40 -0.19 2.54 0.18
1998-2 1.81 1.27 1.37 1.26 1.31 2.59 0.53
1998-3 1.11 1.02 0.96 1.26 0.90 1.91 0.57
1998-4 0.96 1.23 0.95 1.70 1.09 1.67 0.46
1999-1 0.92 1.40 1.06 2.06 1.14 1.75 0.51
1999-2 0.87 1.39 1.15 1.96 1.10 1.65 0.47
1999-3 1.44 1.66 1.53 2.01 1.47 1.88 0.63
1999-4 1.84 1.82 1.88 2.88 1.66 2.08 0.94
2000-1 1.59 1.46 1.38 2.04 1.51 1.94 1.16
2000-2 1.67 1.49 1.37 2.08 1.67 1.63 1.27
2000-3 2.71 1.47 1.39 1.85 1.53 1.57 1.29
2000-4 1.33 1.33 1.21 1.91 1.35 1.76 1.30
2001-1 1.40 1.23 1.26 2.92 1.32 1.94 1.30 1.66
2001-2 1.07 1.05 1.09 1.81 1.02 1.45 1.11 1.27
Continued on next page
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DATE YAPI FINANS FORTIS ISBANK GARANT AKBANK TSKB TEB
2001-3 0.86 0.83 0.95 1.46 0.80 1.35 0.87 1.08
2001-4 1.12 1.00 1.18 1.53 0.96 1.62 1.01 1.44
2002-1 1.46 1.16 1.47 1.68 1.29 1.93 1.08 1.53
2002-2 1.08 1.33 1.79 2.01 1.45 2.26 1.16 1.59
2002-3 1.05 1.50 2.05 1.99 1.61 2.21 1.37 1.83
2002-4 0.88 1.43 2.23 1.90 1.57 2.03 1.43 1.89
2003-1 0.79 1.29 1.92 1.78 1.43 1.87 1.47 2.06
2003-2 1.16 1.36 1.97 1.53 1.52 1.96 1.43 2.31
2003-3 1.38 1.46 1.97 1.66 1.66 2.12 1.57 2.37
2003-4 1.71 1.77 1.96 1.86 1.87 2.30 1.71 2.28
2004-1 1.77 2.29 2.32 1.93 2.03 2.67 2.00 2.42
2004-2 1.68 2.14 2.06 2.33 1.95 2.72 2.23 1.97
2004-3 1.70 2.32 2.10 2.37 2.07 2.76 2.30 1.97
2004-4 2.08 2.42 2.53 2.68 2.48 3.09 2.66 2.08
2005-1 2.46 2.14 2.53 3.04 2.68 2.96 2.04 1.90
2005-2 2.79 2.34 2.92 3.02 2.83 3.05 2.10 2.11
2005-3 2.75 2.21 3.05 3.02 3.05 2.99 2.12 2.06
2005-4 2.81 2.32 3.24 2.95 3.31 2.95 2.05 2.16
2006-1 3.32 2.46 3.40 2.80 3.57 2.95 2.65 2.18
2006-2 2.68 2.44 2.79 2.62 3.02 2.40 1.99 1.71
2006-3 2.64 2.91 2.56 2.29 2.72 2.40 2.09 1.78
2006-4 2.70 3.34 2.79 2.41 2.52 2.56 2.07 1.89
2007-1 2.59 4.18 2.61 2.35 2.47 2.79 2.10 2.01
2007-2 3.03 4.36 2.75 2.47 2.65 3.70 2.69 2.60
2007-3 2.95 3.90 2.60 2.66 2.53 3.22 2.74 2.51
2007-4 2.92 3.85 2.61 2.52 2.44 2.92 2.90 2.48
2008-1 2.45 4.95 2.46 2.39 2.07 2.43 2.56 2.00
Continued on next page
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DATE YAPI FINANS FORTIS ISBANK GARANT AKBANK TSKB TEB
2008-2 2.30 4.12 2.55 2.27 1.91 2.22 2.54 2.01
2008-3 2.18 2.01 2.07 2.29 1.82 1.99 2.35 1.92
2008-4 1.57 1.66 1.65 1.77 1.47 1.59 2.01 1.43
2009-1 1.62 1.48 1.59 1.68 1.55 1.54 2.10 1.54
2009-2 1.68 1.53 1.45 1.74 1.57 1.49 2.06 1.50
2009-3 1.85 2.27 1.76 1.85 1.82 1.81 2.25 1.64
2009-4 2.67 2.56 2.13 2.42 2.40 2.29 2.60 2.14
2010-1 3.01 2.84 2.34 2.81 2.59 2.66 2.65 2.16
2010-2 3.06 2.54 2.88 2.82 2.79 3.01 2.82 2.22
2010-3 3.47 2.71 3.14 2.99 3.05 3.47 3.16 2.51
2010-4 3.34 2.53 3.27 3.37 3.05 3.51 3.27 2.82
2011-1 3.26 2.77 3.33 3.15 3.38 3.55 2.75
2011-2 3.31 3.02 3.56 3.32 3.51 3.53 3.09
2011-3 2.63 2.89 3.21 2.93 2.90 2.92 2.85
2011-4 2.50 1.98 2.91 2.86 2.73 2.75 2.82
2012-1 2.46 2.04 2.86 2.94 2.73 2.93 3.36
2012-2 2.46 2.05 2.94 3.02 2.77 3.02 3.17
2012-3 2.98 2.18 3.20 3.63 3.35 3.53 3.56
2012-4 3.52 4.80 3.63 4.18 3.84 4.29 3.93
2013-1 3.90 4.73 3.97 4.21 4.17 4.49 4.13
2013-2 2.99 4.25 3.89 3.18 3.49 3.58 3.09
2013-3 2.72 3.69 3.05 2.66 2.83 3.16 3.09
2013-4 2.59 3.37 2.86 2.50 2.61 2.96 3.05
2014-1 2.55 2.98 2.84 2.38 2.51 2.90 2.95
2014-2 3.09 2.66 2.80 2.68 2.74 3.47 4.46
2014-3 3.51 2.85 3.42 3.11 3.14 3.82 4.78
2014-4 3.62 3.06 3.65 3.10 3.24 4.11 4.12
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DATE YAPI FINANS FORTIS ISBANK GARANT AKBANK TSKB TEB
2015-1 3.76 3.48 3.39 3.15 3.33 4.14 6.18
2015-2 3.70 2.87 3.29 3.11 3.29 4.14
2015-3 3.54 2.22 3.11 3.02 3.23 4.25
2015-4 3.39 1.58 3.02 3.08 4.17 3.85
2016-1 3.39 1.52 3.25 3.39 3.43 3.83
2016-2 3.44 1.60 3.39 3.43 3.50 3.68
2016-3 3.23 1.89 3.44 3.31 3.36 3.32
2016-4 3.45 3.10 3.68 3.71 3.68 3.68
2017-1 3.43 2.62 3.84 3.71 3.74 3.73
2017-2 3.67 3.33 3.90 4.04 4.04 3.97
2017-3 3.95 2.48 4.39 4.55 4.81 4.70
2017-4 3.70 2.40 4.03 4.10 4.17 4.71
2018-1 3.79 2.41 3.72 3.89 4.12 4.51
2018-2 3.15 2.36 3.55 3.29 3.61 4.02
2018-3 2.57 2.30 2.74 2.45 2.79 2.91
2018-4 2.58 1.79 1.48 2.30 2.57 2.62
Table A14: Distance to Default for Turkish Banks-Second Part
DATE ALBARA DENIZ VAKIF HALK TOPRAK DEMIR TUTUN ASYA
1996-4 1.33 1.36
1997-1 2.47 1.33
1997-2 1.20 1.97
1997-3 1.35 1.99
1997-4 1.03 1.63
1998-1 1.15 2.24
1998-2 1.33 2.01
Continued on next page
81
Table A14 – Continued from previous page
DATE ALBARA DENIZ VAKIF HALK TOPRAK DEMIR TUTUN ASYA
1998-3 1.07 0.97
1998-4 1.27 0.88
1999-1 1.39 0.61
1999-2 0.98 1.17 0.60
1999-3 1.31 1.53 1.45
1999-4 1.55 1.61 1.73
2000-1 1.23
2000-2 1.23
2000-3 0.90
2000-4 0.63
2001-1 0.80
2001-2 0.68
2005-4 1.95
2006-1 2.25
2006-2 2.25
2006-3 2.53
2006-4 2.70
2007-1 2.47 2.39
2007-2 2.93 2.72 3.19
2007-3 2.80 2.69 3.39
2007-4 2.87 2.69 3.64
2008-1 3.70 2.27 2.91
2008-2 3.61 3.72 2.15 2.02 2.56
2008-3 3.40 1.50 1.88 1.81 2.15
2008-4 3.13 1.07 1.53 1.39 1.51
2009-1 3.18 0.95 1.61 1.48 1.60
2009-2 2.90 0.85 1.60 1.44 1.71
Continued on next page
82
Table A14 – Continued from previous page
DATE ALBARA DENIZ VAKIF HALK TOPRAK DEMIR TUTUN ASYA
2009-3 3.07 1.45 1.89 1.70 1.96
2009-4 3.04 1.98 2.36 2.41 2.77
2010-1 2.95 1.94 2.44 2.38 2.78
2010-2 3.03 1.94 2.58 2.53 2.76
2010-3 3.14 1.95 2.90 2.90 2.97
2010-4 3.30 1.90 3.15 2.93 3.22
2011-1 3.30 2.95 3.15 2.95 3.28
2011-2 3.38 3.77 3.48 3.28 3.48
2011-3 3.08 3.36 2.98 2.81 2.85
2011-4 3.12 1.81 2.78 2.70 2.80
2012-1 3.37 1.86 2.65 2.85 2.98
2012-2 3.44 1.49 2.62 2.83 3.03
2012-3 3.75 1.48 2.95 3.20 3.76
2012-4 3.92 2.33 3.32 3.65 4.22
2013-1 4.03 2.41 3.56 3.64 3.99
2013-2 3.83 3.89 2.85 3.13 3.11
2013-3 3.45 4.10 2.52 2.83 2.92
2013-4 3.12 3.81 2.40 2.44 2.54
2014-1 3.10 3.61 2.29 2.31 1.86
2014-2 3.31 3.90 2.60 2.56 1.87
2014-3 3.75 4.20 2.86 2.77 1.27
2014-4 4.61 4.92 2.99 3.11 1.11
2015-1 4.77 4.29 3.11 3.30 1.36
2015-2 4.24 4.18 2.95 3.14 1.04
2015-3 4.11 1.09 2.91 2.97 1.48
2015-4 4.03 0.98 2.77 2.71
2016-1 3.91 1.01 2.96 2.75
Continued on next page
83
Table A14 – Continued from previous page
DATE ALBARA DENIZ VAKIF HALK TOPRAK DEMIR TUTUN ASYA
2016-2 4.39 0.94 3.02 2.85
2016-3 3.78 2.12 2.82 2.72
2016-4 3.81 2.32 3.13 3.11
2017-1 4.29 2.08 3.11 2.75
2017-2 4.30 2.44 3.38 2.89
2017-3 5.09 2.53 3.88 3.15
2017-4 2.75 2.83 3.33 2.66
2018-1 2.56 2.00 3.33 3.06
2018-2 2.35 1.53 3.15 2.66
2018-3 2.18 1.62 2.49 2.24
2018-4 2.93 1.27 2.38 2.23
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